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ABSTRACT
Estimating the effect of trade on capital flows is difficult given the inherent identification problem.
We use fluctuations in rainfall to capture the exogenous variation in trade between Germany, France,
the U.K., and the Ottoman Empire during 1859-1913. The provisionistic policy of the Ottoman Empire|only
surplus production was exported|constitutes the basis of our identification strategy. We find that one
standard deviation in rainfalls from the mean leads to a 3.5 percent increase in Ottoman exports, which
in turn causes a 10 percent increase in capital inflows from the three source countries. Our findings












The classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell paradigm states that trade and capital ows are substitutes
as trade integration equalizes factor prices and eliminates the need for capital to ow towards
capital scarce countries. By introducing technological dierences across countries, Kemp (1966)
and Jones (1967) argue that trade and capital ows can be complements with full specialization
of at least one country. Helpman and Razin (1978) show a similar result arising from production
uncertainty. Both in the Kemp-Jones and the Helpman-Razin frameworks, causality runs from
international capital ows to trade. Although direct empirical support for this channel has been
absent, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2003) provides indirect evidence by showing that
regions with higher levels of risk sharing also have higher levels of industrial specialization.
In a recent paper, Antras and Caballero (2009) highlight a dierent mechanism, where
causality runs from trade to capital ows. They argue that in less nancially developed countries
trade integration increases the incentives for capital to ow into these economies. Their specic
mechanism works through the existence of nancial constraints that create a misallocation of
capital across sectors. Trade alleviates this misallocation problem. Although no direct evidence
has been found for this specic story, there is empirical work that shows a positive eect of trade
on capital ows. Using a cross-sectional approach, Taylor and Wilson (2006) nds a positive
eect of trade on nancial ows, instrumenting trade with distance. Their interpretation is that
trade decreases asymmetric information and hence enhances capital ows. However, as shown by
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009), Portes and Rey (2001) and Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007),
distance and other non time-varying gravity related factors determine both trade in assets and
trade in goods, and hence cannot be valid instruments for either of them.
Establishing a causal relationship between trade and nancial ows is therefore dicult. As
implied by the various theoretical models causality can run both ways, and it is not clear how
to interpret a positive correlation between trade and capital ows. In addition there can be
standard omitted variable bias. The inability to control for common shocks such as nancial
crisis and/or sovereign default episodes will create a simultaneity problem in capital ow and
trade patterns as shown by Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005). The existing empirical literature
does not adequately address the endogeneity problem and fails to provide evidence for the causal
eect of trade on capital ows.
1In this paper, we use exogenous variation in rainfall as an instrument for trade. We use a
yearly panel data set for the period 1859{1913 that covers trade and nancial ows (private
and public) between three source countries{ France, Germany, and the U.K. { and one host
country, the Ottoman Empire. There is an extensive literature that uses weather shocks as
an instrument for growth in GDP in agricultural economies without well-developed irrigation
systems that rely on rain.1 Our identication strategy is similar in the sense that it is based on
temporary uctuations in agricultural production caused by year-to-year changes in rainfall.2
This is the key variation we use that is the variation around the \permanent" component of
rainfall which might aect long-run production and trade patterns. This strategy is relevant
for our case, given that we can document clearly a case where rainfalls aect capital ows only
through exports in the short-run. Our innovation comes not only from the fact that we are the
rst to use rainfall variation to predict the eect of trade on capital ows, but also in a unique
historical context that delivers our exclusion restriction.
Historians emphasize the fact that in the early modern period we study, the economic envi-
ronment was closely related to the political and administrative one. The Ottoman Empire was
no exception to this rule. The leading concern of Ottoman policy was the adequate provisioning
of food for the army, palace and urban areas. This emphasis on provisioning created an impor-
tant distinction between imports and exports. Imports were encouraged since they added to the
available goods in urban markets. Exports, on the other hand, were permitted only once the
requirements of the domestic economy were met.3 Pamuk and Williamson (2009) argue that
these provisionistic views interacted with the increased integration of the Ottoman economy into
world markets during the 19th century and paved the way for the Ottoman de-industrialization
process that had been completed around 1850. The Empire became an importer of manufac-
tured goods and exporter of surplus agricultural goods, such as cotton, grapes, corn, grain,
olives, raisins, and gs.
Rainfall is very important for these agricultural products: a typical estimate found in the
1This literature goes back to Paxson (1992), who used weather variability to measure response of savings to
temporary income uctuations. See Schlenker and Roberts (2006), and Deschenes and Greenstone (2007) who
focus on U.S. agricultural production.
2Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) use yearly changes in rainfall to identify the eect of temporary
growth on the likelihood of civil conict in Africa.
3See Genc (1970) and Inalcik (1994) among others.
2literature is that 1 standard deviation increase in rainfalls delivers a 30 percent increase in the
production of agricultural goods.4 We map the regional production of these primary products
against rain patterns, to provide exogenous variation in the export bundles that the U.K.,
France, and Germany were buying from the Ottomans. We use a historical precipitation dataset
that is based on the \tree-ring" methodology. This methodology recovers the level of rainfall
during a growing season based on the width of the tree rings, in a given year. During droughts,
rings are narrower, while extensive moisture results in wider rings. To check the validity of the
tree-ring methodology, we compared our rainfall data constructed from tree-rings to real-time
historical rain data from two dierent sources, obtaining a good match between the data sets.5
We need to use regional variation within the Ottoman Empire since certain agricultural goods
were grown in certain regions and each source country buy specic agricultural goods from the
Ottoman Empire. By using regional variation in rainfall we know the temporary shock to each
agricultural crop that is being imported from the Empire.
The following example will clarify the thought experiment behind the construction of the
instrument. Suppose the percentage deviation in rainfalls in year t is 10 percent for region
A and 20 percent for region B, and there was no deviation in rainfalls from the mean for
the other regions of the Empire. Also suppose, region B's land is distributed in a way that 70
percent is share of cultivation (\grain" products) and 30 percent is fruit and vegetable production
(\orchard"). For region A, the distribution is 80/20 percent between grains and orchards.
Then we can calculate a weighted average index of regional rainfall deviations given the land
distribution of production to obtain the yearly rainfall shock to grain and orchard production.6
Next, to create country-time variation in the instrument, we combine this yearly product specic
weather shock with the initial (rst year in our sample) content of trade: Ottoman grain versus
orchard exports into France, Germany, the U.K. at the beginning of our sample.
This unique historical context constitutes the basis of our identication. First, our instru-
ment explains the variation in the main explanatory variable, Ottoman exports. Secondly, it
4See Donaldson (2009) estimates for the India for the same period.
5The rst real-time historical data comes from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. de-
partment of Commerce. The second one is from Ottoman Archives but only for the city of Izmir. Both sets are
not available for all our regions and time periods and hence cannot be used in the regression analysis.
6Specically, in this example, rainfall shock to grain produciton=0:2  0:7 + 0:1  0:8 and rainfall shock to
orchard production=0:2  0:3 + 0:1  0:2
3is also excludable as rainfall will aect investment by the northern countries into the Ottoman
Empire only through the eect of trade in the short-run. The reasoning relies on the fact that
we only use short-run uctuations in rainfalls, which created temporary variation in the size of
surplus production, which in turn created variation in exports given the provisionistic policy.
Our strategy of using short-run uctuations allows us to avoid the eects of permanent
rainfall dierences on incomes and the subsequent permanent eect on capital ows. Temporary
uctuations in income should not bring in more foreign capital in the light of the standard
dynamic open economy models that predict an eect of a productivity shock on country's capital
inows, if and only if the shock is long-lived. In the case of a temporary shock (yearly uctuations
in rainfalls), savings will increase only with no change on investment, resulting on net capital
outows.7 The length of our time series allows us not only to exploit time-series variation and
control for unobserved heterogeneity using country xed eects, but also makes it possible to
include country specic trends that will account for any increasing investment by Northern
countries into the Ottoman Empire.
Our main empirical ndings are as follows. In the OLS specications we nd a positive
correlation between Ottoman exports and capital inows from the U.K., France, and Germany.
The point estimates imply a 10 percent increase in Ottoman exports into Northern countries
being associated with a 5 percent increase in FDI from the North to the Ottoman Empire, both
variables explained as a share of Northern countries GDP. In the reduced form, estimates of FDI
on our weighted rainfall index show a robust positive signicant eect. Our rst stage predicts
that a deviation of 10 percent in rainfall from the mean (which approximately corresponds to
one standard deviation in rainfall from the mean) resulted in a 3 percent increase in Ottoman
exports.8 Finally, our second stage regressions deliver an eect of a 3 to 15 percent increase in
FDI as a result of a 3 percent increase in exports, depending on the specication. The second
stage estimates are slightly higher than the OLS estimates, implying the OLS estimates are
biased downwards due to measurement error in export data.
7During the course of the 19th century, capital ows were one way from the center to the periphery countries,
as argued by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), and hence capital outows were essentially zero. The authors argue
that this is either because periphery countries were full colonies or they were not integrated fully into the world
markets to invest their savings.
8See also Dell, Jones, and Olken (2008, 2009) who focus the eect of weather changes (temperature and
precipitation) on GDP and exports and nd large estimates in the case of exports.
4Our results are consistent with the nancial frictions hypothesis of Antras and Caballero
(2009) in the sense that the existence of trade ties increases the return to capital and promotes
capital ows to the nancially underdeveloped economies. In their model, with trade integration,
the South (here the Ottomans) specialize in the unconstrained sector (agriculture) and become
a net importer of the nancially dependent sector (manufacturing). This was indeed the case,
as argued by Pamuk and Williamson (2009), starting with the trade liberalization treaty of
1838.9 Altug, Filiztekin, and Pamuk (2008) report that agriculture started becoming dependent
on external nance only after the 1950s, when mechanization started. In the Antras-Caballero
model, trade integration does not bring factor price equalization, and it raises the return to
capital in the South. Given the depressed wages in the South and equalization of good prices,
capitalists earn a higher return in the South. Hence trade solves the misallocation of capital
problem due to nancing constraints.
Complementarity between trade and capital ows can also arise in modied versions of
Heckser-Ohlin-Mundell type frameworks as argued above. However, notice that in those models
causality almost always runs from capital ows to trade, where comparative advantage is not
driven by dierences in capital-labor ratios but rather by other channels (see, Markusen, 1983).
Our results show there is causality running from trade integration to capital ows. This does not
mean there is no causal eect of FDI on trade. In fact, in a historical context there are many
cases of signicant investment by the core countries into the infrastructure of the periphery
countries (such as railroads), which ended up boosting trade between the two. The German-
Ottoman strategic partnership for a Berlin-Baghdad railroad is a case in point.10 This is exactly
why a strong identication strategy is necessary to see if the positive correlation between FDI
and trade is solely driven by the eect of such infrastructure FDI on trade, or rather there is
also a signicant causal impact of trade on FDI, which is the case as we show here.11
9This 1838 Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention was not only viewed as the Empire's transition to economic
liberalism but also thought of marking the \collapse" of Ottoman industry according to many historians (Issawi,
1982), especially the guildsmanship with the inux of cheap manufactured goods. Note that this treaty eliminates
all duties and taris for foreign merchants while keeping in place an 8 percent internal customs duty for domestic
merchants to transfer goods within the Empire. Export duties are also raised. See Issawi, 1982.
10McMeekin (1994).
11Another possible interpretation of our ndings is a lower degree of the asymmetric information as a result of
increased trade, which in turn encourages foreign private investment. We think this is unlikely in the case of the
Ottoman Empire and the core European powers of the time given the Ottoman presence in Europe (military and
economic) and numerous visits and extended stays by European merchants and diplomats in the Empire since
5A valid threat to the identication is the possibility of omitted variable bias, where a third
variable can drive both Ottoman exports to North and North's investment in the Empire. Our
instrumental variables strategy will be able to deal with this issue as long as the omitted variable
is not correlated with the instrument. To advance on this, we use country and time xed eects
and country-specic trends together with controls for GDP and population dierences, imports,
and also Ottoman government debt.12 We also condition our results on the the direct negative
eect of 1876 Ottoman default. As a result of default both trade and nancial ows can go
down regardless of the temporary shocks to trade caused by rainfalls. Our results are not
only robust to controlling the default episode but also to the establishment of Ottoman Public
Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1881. The OPDA was established after the debt restructuring
negotiations for the purpose of paying the creditors. We show that the positive eect of trade
on FDI ows weakened after the establishment of the OPDA. In this sense, our results are also
consistent with the punishment hypothesis which is advanced by Wright (2004), Mitchener and
Weidenmier (2005), and Rose and Spiegel (2004) based on the reputation theory of Bulow and
Rogo (1989). Here, more trade induces more nancial ows due to the fact that increased
trade over time serves as an implicit guarantee for the creditors, since potential loss of welfare
from a larger trade volume lowers the probability of default.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the historical and institutional
context together with the data. Section 3 discusses the descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents
the empirical specication, the results and the robustness analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Historical-Institutional Context and Data
The Ottoman Empire stood at the crossroads of civilizations, stretching from the Balkans to
Egypt for six centuries prior to World War I. Given the coverage of our data from 1859{1913, this
paper focuses on the borders of the Empire from 1830 until World War I, as shown in gure 1.
These borders include northern Greece, Syria, Iraq and present-day Turkey, but exclude Egypt
and Libya.
In light of the new evidence from the archives, historians no longer think the Ottoman Empire
1500s.
12Some of these results are not shown for space considerations and available upon request.
6was in a state of a permanent decline in the 16th century. It is now realized that the Ottoman
state was exible and pragmatic and was able to adapt to the changing environment. Although
the 17th century was a period of crisis, the 18th century witnessed an expansion of trade and an
increase in production. The Empire was shrinking starting in the middle of the 18th century due
to territorial losses, but at the same time, during most of the 19th century, the Empire become
more linked to Europe via commercial and nancial networks. The provisioning of the capital
city, the armed forces and the urban areas, taxation, support, regulation of long-distance trade,
and the maintenance of a steady supply of money were among the main policy concerns of the
state. Hence, the government constantly intervened in economic aairs. The Ottoman Empire
is not unique in this respect, as the pursuit of similar policy goals is thought to have led to the
emergence of powerful nation states in Europe and Asia (Tilly, 1975).
During our sample period, the world economy had witnessed an enormous expansion of
trade between center and periphery countries. Thanks to the Industrial Revolution, European
(center) countries became exporters of manufactured goods. These countries were selling their
manufactured products to the third world (periphery) countries and at the same time they were
buying primary products and raw materials from the periphery countries.
Among the periphery countries, China and the Ottoman Empire had a unique place since
they had a strong central bureaucracy and their governments had the upper hand in the struggle
between the bureaucracy and the interest-groups such as merchants and export-oriented land-
lords (Genc (1987); Inalcik and Quataert (1994)). These countries were also never colonized.
In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the sultans and state ocials were aware of the critical
role played by merchants. Long distance trade was very important for the provisioning of the
Empire. Foreign merchants were especially welcome since they brought goods that were not
available in Ottoman lands and they were granted various privileges and concessions at the ex-
pense of domestic merchants. Historians argue that this is the primary reason why mercantilist
ideas never took root in Ottoman lands. While the ideas of domestic merchants and producers
were inuential in the development of mercantilism in Europe, the priorities of the central bu-
reaucracy dominated economic thought in the Ottoman Empire. The policy priority was such
that only surplus agricultural production could be exported abroad after the army, palace and
the urban markets were satiated. This provisionistic policy created a dierence in the attitude of
7sultans towards foreign and domestic merchants, and hence between imports and exports (Genc
(1987); Inalcik and Quataert (1994)). Trade between the Ottoman Empire and the European
countries increased 15-fold between 1820{1914. However, given the provisionistic policy, the
share of Ottoman exports in total production did not exceed 6 to 8 percent and 12 to 15 per-
cent in agricultural production until 1910 (Pamuk (1987)). By 1910, 25 percent of agricultural
production was exported, whereas 80 percent of manufactured goods were imported.
The 19th century was characterized by one-way capital ows from center European countries
to periphery third world countries. Our data covers such one-way private capital ows (FDI)
from France, Germany, and the U.K. into the Ottoman Empire during 1859{1913 period. We
also have data on exports from the Ottoman Empire into France, Germany and the U.K. and
imports of the Ottoman Empire from these three center countries. Both sets of data come from
Pamuk (2003) and Pamuk (1987) and they are expressed in British pound sterling. The top
panel of gure 2 shows the total Ottoman exports and imports during our sample period, using
data from Pamuk (1987). There was an eight-fold increase in imports and a quadrupling of
exports, a pattern that led to accumulation of current account decits. The sharp decline in
both exports and imports after the default of 1876 is visible. The bottom panel in the same
gure plots the same total exports series from the top panel together with exports to the U.K.,
France, and Germany, where the last constitutes almost half of the total exports.
The expansion of trade between center and periphery countries was followed by investment
of European powers into the third world. It was not only the case that European governments
lent money to the periphery governments, but in addition private foreign money owed into the
periphery countries. Some of this investment was in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI)
to nance infrastructure such as railroads, with the aim to expand trade even more. Foreign
investment was not solely concentrated in infrastructure. As of 1888, while 33 percent of total
foreign investment from Europe in the Ottoman Empire was in railroads, 31 percent was in
banking, 9 percent was in utilities, 8 percent in commerce, 12 percent was in industry, and 5
percent was in mining, as shown in Pamuk (1987). Foreign investment in the agricultural sector
remained limited until the end of World War I.
The top panel of gure 3 shows private investment (FDI) from the U.K., France and Germany
into the Empire. Overall, France was the biggest investor followed by the U.K. and Germany.
8German investment did not start until after the signing of the strategic German-Ottoman part-
nership, which also marks the start of the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railroad in 1885.
The bottom panel of the same gure shows the country by country decomposition of exports
from the previous gure. Again, exports into Germany in general are low compared to the U.K.
and France, and only slightly increased during the last three decades of our sample period, co-
inciding with the increased FDI from Germany. Similar to exports and imports in the previous
gure, there is a stark decline after 1876 in FDI, up to 60 percent, and then a recovery. This is
also true for exports by destination country as shown in the bottom panel. Both declines follow
the default of the Ottoman Empire on its external debt in 1876.
In the course of the 19th century, the Ottomans undertook many reforms to modernize the
economy. They needed foreign capital not only to nance this modernization eort but also to
keep their growing scal decit under control given the increased cost of Russian and Balkan
wars. The Ottomans borrowed heavily from Europe during the 1850s and 1860s. This did
not prevent the nancial crisis of 1873, and the subsequent default in 1876 on the sovereign
debt. As of 1876, the outstanding debt was 200 million pounds sterling and debt servicing was
taking up half of the budget (Pamuk (1987)). After negotiations, the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration (OPDA) was established in 1881 to exercise European control over Ottoman
nances and to ensure debt payments. The outstanding debt was reduced to half of its value in
nominal terms during the debt restructuring negotiations. (Blaisdell, 1929). The OPDA helped
to repair the lost reputation of the Ottomans, and hence the Ottoman state gained renewed
access to the international capital markets.
3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. The longest series for capital inows is for the U.K.,
where data are available for the entire sample of 55 years. The magnitude of British investment
ows into the Empire, however, was the smallest and constituted on average 0.39 million pounds
sterling versus 1.04 and 0.77 million pounds for France and Germany, respectively.13 We can
also see from Table 1 that Britain was the biggest trading partner of the Ottoman Empire and
13Typically, if a series lacked 1 or 2 years of data, we replace them with the linear time averages of a preceding
and a succeeding values. If, instead, it lacked 3 or more consecutive years of data, we leave it as is.
9purchased, on average, 4.6 million sterling worth of the Empire's exports, while selling them
about 7.6 million sterling worth of imports, on average. The smallest trade was between the
Empire and Germany { only 1.1 million sterling worth of goods were exported, and 0.4 million
sterling was imported by Germany. Unlike the U.K. and Germany, France was the only country
(out of three) which has purchased more than it sold, with Ottoman exports being 3.8 million
and French imports being 2.5 million sterling, respectively. Overall, the Empire was running a
current account decit against all these three countries in total, during our sample period.
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of France, Germany, and the U.K. comes from Mitchell
(1992). Mitchell (1992) and Maddison (1995) also provide some GDP numbers for Turkey. How-
ever, we use the GDP data for the Ottoman Empire that comes from Clemens and Williamson
(2004), which is based on Pamuk's GDP estimates (his later years' gures match other sources).
All the GDP data are expressed in local currencies, which we have converted into British sterling
using the \Gold Standard" exchange rates (see appendix table A1). During our sample period,
1 sterling corresponded to a xed 7.3223 grams of ne gold, and thus, we implicitly measure all
the \monetary" variables in gold. As shown in table 1, the Ottoman Empire is roughly 10 times
poorer, per capita, than the European countries.
Population numbers for the Ottoman Empire come from Behar (1996) while the data on
the population of France, Germany, and the U.K. come from the Maddison (1995). Table 1
shows that at the beginning of the sample in 1859, France was the largest country among
those three, with a population of over 37 million. The smallest was Great Britain with about
28 million in population. During 1859{1913, France, Germany and Great Britain experienced
drastic dierences in population growth rates. By 1913, Germany's population had increased
by 85 percent, and it approached WWI with more than 65 million people. The population of
France and the U.K. in the middle of 1913 were 41 and 46 million, respectively.
104 OLS Analysis
4.1 Empirical Specication











+ Zit + it (1)
where i is a country-xed eect and it is a country specic-trend. The left hand side variable
is gross FDI inows from the source countries (denoted as i), which are France, Germany and the
U.K., into the Ottoman Empire. EXPORTS are Ottoman exports into these countries. Both
FDI and EXPORTS are normalized by GDP of the source countries, GDPit. The set of control
variables, Zit includes dierent time dummies such as a time dummy for the creation of the
Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1881, and other time dummies characterizing
the eect of Empire's default on the foreign debt in 1876, and the Resettlement of the debt in
1903. Controls also includes source countries' and the Empire's GDP per capita, population,
imports, and aggregate Ottoman public debt.
4.2 Results
We report results from the OLS estimation of equation (1) in Table 2. In all of the specications,
exports turn are positive and highly signicant. None of the controls in columns (2) to (6) change
the main result. The results are also economically signicant, where a 10 percent increase in
exports lead to a 3-5 percent increase in FDI ows. We show results with and without country
specic time trends, and both lead to the same ndings. Specications with time xed eects
yield similar results but we prefer not to use time xed eects since we want to quantify the
particular eects of certain events such as default, establishment of OPDA and debt resettlement,
instead of absorbing them, thorough the use of time eects.
To study the eect of the Ottoman Empire's default in 1876, we introduce a \Default"
dummy, which equals 0 before 1876, and 1 thereafter. As was expected, by defaulting on its
foreign debt, the Ottoman Empire discouraged further investment, reducing capital ows into
the country (columns (1)-(4)). In 1881, the Ottoman government decided to take actions toward
11repayment of the debt, and established a European-controlled organization, called the Ottoman
Public Debt Administration (OPDA), designed to collect taxes which then were turned over to
creditors. We take this event into account by introducing an \OPDA" time dummy, which is
equal to 0 before 1881, and 1 after that. OPDA is signicant only in specication (4), although
it enters positively in all the specications. In 1903, the creditors voluntarily restructured the
remaining debt of the Ottoman Empire, partially reducing its size. We capture that eect by yet
another time dummy, \Resettlement," which equals 1 after 1903. This dummy enters positively
and signicantly in some specications. In columns (6) and (7), we also control for source and
host country GDP per capita, and imports of the Ottoman Empire. These variables do not
seem to have an impact. It is interesting that imports have no relationship with capital ows
in this historical period characterized by one-way ows. In the modern day data after 1970s, in
general, both exports and imports are positively correlated with capital ows. In not-reported
specications we also control for Ottoman government debt, obtaining similar results.
There is also the possibility the OPDA changed the nature of the relationship between
exports and FDI. Hence, in columns (5)-(7) we add the interaction term ExportsOPDA into
the regression. We see that it is negative and signicant and equal about -0.200, while the main
eect increases to roughly 0.500. This result means that there was a permanent change in the
eect of exports on FDI: before 1881, the slope is about 0.500, while after 1881, it decreased
down to about 0.300. One interpretation of this result might be the possibility that after the
introduction of the OPDA, there was less need for a trade relationship to keep serving as a
guarantee for repayments of credit { that function was in part taken over by the OPDA itself.
For robustness, we also normalize FDI and exports by population of source countries instead
of their GDP. Note that there is no point in normalizing with Ottoman GDP and population
since that will be a common factor among the three source countries and be absorbed by the
constant term. When we normalize by population of the source country, the results are very
similar in magnitude to those described below: the trade coecient stays at the same level of
0.350 and is generally signicant; all time dummies (Default, OPDA, and Resettlement) have
consistent signs and magnitudes.14
14These results are available upon request. Yes another alternative could be to normalize the variables by total
exports and total FDI. Although we have total exports to all countries in addition to three we use, we do not
have total FDI from all countries. In fact we have FDI only from the three countries we use, a limitation of our
125 IV Analysis
We present below a description of construction of our instrument that links regional rainfalls in
the Ottoman Empire to regional agricultural production and to destination-specic exports. The
last part requires us to map regional production to the content of destination-specic exports.
5.1 Rainfalls, Agricultural Production, and Trade
As we have argued in the introduction, the main problem in this literature is identication.
There might be simultaneity between the capital inows and trade, as it is possible that nance
promotes trade rather than vice versa. Our instrumentation strategy relies on explaining trade
with yearly rainfall shocks. Below, we lay out our argument on the linkage between trade,
production and weather conditions, specically the amount of rainfall. We explain in detail how
the composition of exports into the U.K., France, and Germany, as well as specialization of the
Empire's regions in dierent types of crops, allow us to construct the instrument.
The rst step is to highlight the dependency between the level of exports and production.
Excessive output in one particular year leads to a surplus of goods which were available for sale
in and out of the country, causing exports to increase. This line of thought mainly comes from
the \provisionistic" nature of Empire's policy.15 As the government policy at those times was
aimed to primarily satisfy the needs of the Ottoman army, the supply of exports was determined
not only by the prices, but also by the yield in that particular year. If the yield was low, it had
to go rst towards satisfying the army needs; if there remained any excess over this amount it
could be traded abroad.
As discussed in Pamuk and Williamson (2009), by the beginning of the second half of the
19th century, the de-industrialization of the Ottoman Empire was practically complete. La-
bor and other resources were pulled out of industry, and agricultural production constituted
data set.
15According to Genc (1987, 2000) there were three underlying principles for the Ottoman's development policies.
These are provisionism, scalism and traditionalism. Provisionism is very important, especially from 16th to 19th
century since during this period maintaining a large and consistent supply of goods in the urban economy and
feeding the army was the priority. Provisionism determined state's production and trade policies and its relations
with merchants. For example, imports were always good and exports were bad; foreign merchants favored over
domestic ones; there were rigid price controls especially for the grain products.
13the biggest part of the Ottoman Empire's GDP.16 Altug, Filiztekin, and Pamuk (2008) state
that \Mechanization of agriculture began [only] in the 1950s, making nature one of the most
important determinants of people's well-being at those times," and Quataert (1994) adds that
\Mechanized factory output was and remained relatively insignicant in the 19th century when
compared with domestic and handcraft production."
Agricultural goods made up a signicant share of Ottoman exports. Therefore, the amount of
rainfall was an important determinant of both domestic production and trade. Indeed, Donald-
son (2009) for the case of India during 1861{1930 shows that \a one standard deviation increase
in rainfall causes a 27 percent increase in agricultural productivity," thus aecting both quantity
and quality of agricultural crops. For the case of grapes { one of the most important exports
{ Hellman (2004) gives an estimated 98 mm of water use per month to maximize quantity and
quality of crop. This estimate is obtained for the most ecient modern drip irrigation system;
for the furrow irrigation that historically was used in the Ottoman Empire, ideal water usage
doubles to 196 mm. Another important agricultural product of the Empire was cotton. There
is substantial evidence that \water decit during critical growth stages can signicantly reduce
cotton yields" (Steger et al. (1998), Grimes et al. (1970)). For example, in the time of emer-
gence (typically, in October) cotton elds require about 60 mm of monthly water usage. Water
requirements increase during the next 5 months, reaching 255 mm a month in late February.
Again, one of the main determinants of the yield of dryland (unirrigated) cotton are regular and
predictable rainfalls. Similar patterns hold for other important agricultural export goods of the
Ottoman Empire such as corn, grain, and olives. Dependency on rainfall is especially important
given that the development of irrigation systems occurred in Turkey only at the end of the 20th
century (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2003)), which is
outside the time frame we consider in this paper.
Measuring the eect of rainfalls on various types of crops produced, including grain, grape,
olives, cotton and others, is possible since the rainfall data is available on a region by region
basis, and dierent regions specialized in dierent crops.
The area of modern-day Turkey amounts to 300,948 square miles, which equals 779,452
16For example, the share of industrial production in GDP in 1913 constituted only 13 percent. During 1880{
1913, 80 percent of the labor force was employed in the agricultural sector (Altug, Filiztekin and Pamuk (2008)).
14square kilometers. 265,931 square kilometers (a little more than one third) of those lands are
used for agricultural purposes (TYS (2005)). In the past, a higher fraction of the land was used
for agricultural production, plus there was more land under the Ottoman Empire's boundaries.
Nevertheless, we assume the specialization of regions in crops stays more or less the same given
the geographical conditions.17 Historically and in modern day Turkey, dierent regions specialize
in dierent types of agricultural production. Turkey consists of 80 administrative provinces, 12
statistical regions (SRE) and 7 geographical regions. The rst 4 of the 7 regions have the
names of the seas which are adjacent to them. Those regions are Black Sea Region, Marmara
Region, Aegean Region, and Mediterranean Region. The other 3 regions are named according to
their location in the Anatolia: Central Anatolia Region, Eastern Anatolia Region, Southeastern
Anatolia Region. In every region, agricultural land is typically split into two parts. The rst
part is cultivated eld land. These lands are used to grow various types of grain (corn, wheat,
barley, rye, etc), as well as cotton and tobacco. The second type is the area of fruit trees, olive
trees, vineyards, vegetable gardens, and an area reserved for tea plantations. For consistency,
we call the rst type of land \grain" land, and the second type \orchard" land. As shown in
appendix table A2, the share of \grain" land varies from 35 percent in the East Black Sea region,
to as high as 99 percent in North East Anatolia. As explained above, we assume the shares of
\grain" and \orchard" lands are roughly the same in the 1859{1913 and today.
The dierences in the shares of \grain" and \orchard" lands inside each region, as well as
the share of a region in the total country-wide production lead to dierent eects of rainfalls on
yields of dierent types of crop in dierent regions. As an example, let there be an unusually
extensive rain in the Aegean region, and abnormally dry weather in the Mediterranean region.
Moreover, let the magnitude of these shocks be the same. We can conclude that rst, this event
would have a negligible eect on total \grain" production in the country. Indeed, if we look
at Table A2, we can see that the area of positively aected \grain" land in the Aegean region
equals 2;187 thousand hectares, and it is fairy close to the negatively aected \grain" area in the
Mediterranean region, which equals 2;132 million hectares. Second, we expect whole country's
output of \orchard" products to increase. The reason for that is that the \orchard" land in the
17Our assumption is based on evidence that current geographic conditions match historic crop mixes, see State
Institute of Statistics' historical and contemporaneous yearbooks, various issues.
15Aegean region is much bigger than that in the Mediterranean region (828 thousand hectares
versus 490 thousand hectares). This simple thought experiment will constitute a basis for the
construction of our instrument.
The historical precipitation dataset we employ in this study is assembled based on the
\tree-ring" methodology { a technique proposed by A. E. Douglass in the 20th century. This
methodology recovers relatively precisely the level of rainfall during a growing season in each
particular year based on the width of age rings, where each ring corresponds to a certain year.
During droughts, rings are typically narrower, while extensive moisture results in wide rings.
This data is not real-time historical data in the sense that it was not collected in the past, but
instead, is being reconstructed nowadays.18
Analyzing tree-ring sites location maps in each study (the maps are available in the original
studies), we are able to tie precipitation data series to dierent statistical regions (SRE), which
are listed on Figure 4. Historical precipitation time series for North-West and South-Central
regions of Turkey (TR8 and TR5) were constructed by Akkemik et al. (2007) and Akkemik
and Aras (2007) respectively, and the time span covered exceeds 300 years. North-West study
area { Kastamonu-Pinarbasi and its vicinity { was located on the southern side of the Kure
Mountains. This corresponds to TR8 statistical region. The South-Central sampling area was
located in the upper and northern part of the Western Taurus Mountains in proximity to Konya,
and corresponds to TR5 region. Griggs et al. (2007) dataset covers North Aegean (TR2),
specically, North-East Greece and North-West Turkey, and goes back by 900 years. The authors
reconstruct (May-June) precipitation based on analysis of oak tree rings. North-West of Turkey
under consideration corresponded to TR2 statistical region. Touchan et al. (2003) build the
dataset which reconstructing Southwestern Turkey (TR6) Spring (May-June) precipitations.
Their data start in 1776, and the sites were located in the TR3 statistical region. Finally,
Touchan et al. (2007) is an extensive reconstruction of precipitations in Eastern-Mediterranean
Region for the last 600 years. This study covers not only Turkey, but also other countries in the
region. Majority of sites located in Turkey are concentrated in TR3 and the West half of TR6.
18As a robustness check, we compare reconstructed precipitation data to \true" historical data, provided by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, and available for download at
their website at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/recons.html. Unfortunately, the time span this dataset covers
is too short to be used in this study, and therefore, it is mainly used to check the \tree-ring" contemporaneous
dataset for possible invalidity. The data between both datasets match well.
16As the data does not allow to separate TR6 precipitations from TR3 precipitation, we decided to
use this series as the best available proxy for the amount of rainfalls in the TR6 region. Because
rainfall data are not available for other territories of the Empire, in further discussion we will
consider only this subset of regions (TR2, TR3, TR5, TR6, and TR8).
To identify whether there was unusually rainy weather or unusually dry weather in a region
j(j = 1::J), and hence whether there was a shock to productivity, we proceed as follows. First,
we measure the percentage deviation of yearly precipitations rjt in a region j during year t from
their average values over the time period under consideration (1859{1913):









where t indexes years, and T, the sample length, is 55, and drjt measures the deviation from
the average. Positive values of this statistic would indicate that in a year t, region j experienced
a high amount of rainfall, which most likely would have resulted in high yield. Having this
index and knowing the distribution of land between the \grain" and \orchard" land in each
region allows us to construct a variable, which reects the country-wide \grain" and \orchard"
production shocks as a result of a unique rain map over the Ottoman Empire in year t. Let Lj be
the agricultural area of region j. It is split into two parts: \grain" land L
g
j and \orchard" land
Lo
j, and Lj = L
g
j + Lo
j. We can dene Sj as the share of \grain" land in the total agricultural







Then the country-wide output shock to \grain" production P
g
t and the output shock to the
\orchard" production Po
t at year t would be the average of the regional shocks, weighted by the
































17This set of indices describes the deviations in production of both types of agricultural outputs
as a function of the amount and location of rainfalls in Turkey. This gives us the time series
variation in our instrument.
The best way to illustrate this formula is to go over an example. Suppose, we know that
some year t was especially rainy. Specically, the percentage deviation from the usual level
of precipitations was 10 percent for the West Marmara region, 20 percent for Aegean and 6
percent for West Anatolia. All other regions experienced usual level of rainfalls. What can
we say about the deviations of grain and orchard production from their average values? The
answer depends on the size of a region Lj and its agricultural specialization Sj. The values
of Lj and Sj come from Table A2, and they are equal to f1,736; 0.87g, f3,010; 0.73g and
f4,221; 0.96g for the West Marmara, Aegean and West Anatolia regions, respectively. To nd
country-wide shock to the production of \grain" and \orchard", we need to use Eq. (4) and







1;971 = 10:07  10 2. These numbers mean that in year t,
production of grain has experienced a positive shock of 6 percent, while production of orchard
has experienced a positive shock of 10 percent. Dierent rain patterns from year to year cause
the time variation of production.
Our next step is to introduce cross sectional variation (meaning between the Empire and the
various Northern trading partners) to our instrument. We are able to do this by relying on the
fact that the composition of exports diers for Germany, France, and the U.K.
Pamuk and Williamson (2009) argue that the Ottoman Empire, while importing manufac-
tures, specialized in the export of primary products, such as wheat, wool, raisins plus gs,
tobacco, opium, and raw silk. As is evident from Table A3, at the beginning of the sample, agri-
cultural products (grain, fruit and vegetable) constituted about 70 percent of exports to both
Germany and the U.K. For France, this share makes up only 26 percent. We speculate that the
reason for this is that, unlike Germany and the U.K., France used to purchase high volumes of
raw silk. Its share constantly made up more than 30 percent of France imports, falling to 18.3
percent only in 1880{1882, right after the default (Pamuk (2003)).
The dierences in exports bundles allow us to obtain cross sectional variation of our in-







m) represent the decomposition of exports of country m into \Grain", \Orchard" and
\Other" according to Table A3. It is important that we use initial values (rst year in our
sample) for these export bundles and do not allow them to vary over time. Hence these initial
export shares can be thought of structural demand for the Empire's products by the Northern
countries.
We construct the variable \Rainfalls," Rmt, which reects the eect of rainfalls onto exports








where as usual, \g" and \o" denote \grain" and \orchard" production, respectively, and the
values of shocks to outputs P
g
t and Po
t are dened according to Eq. (4) and Eq. (5).
5.2 Results: Reduced Form and IV
The reduced form regression of France, Germany, and the U.K. FDI on rainfalls is shown in
table 3.19 Regardless of the presence of country-specic time trends, rainfall is positive and
highly signicant, suggesting that there is a reduced form direct eect of rainfalls on FDI inows.
Note that we interacted rainfalls with OPDA to be consistent with the OLS regression and here
too we see a weakening eect of rainfalls on FDI after the establishment of OPDA. The total eect
is insignicant after the establishment of OPDA as expected since the link between trade and
capital ows weakens after OPDA. This result supports the validity of the exclusion restriction
since the weakening eect of rainfalls on nancial ows mirrors the weakening eect of exports
on nancial ows after the establishment of OPDA.20 The other control variables are in general
not signicant especially upon the inclusion of country-specic trends.
The rst stage regression of exports on rainfall as well as the 2SLS results of the eect of
exports on FDI are presented in table 4. The rst stage regressions (the bottom panel) show
that indeed, rainfalls were a signicant determinant of exports: in specications (1)-(3), the
19We have 114 observations here instead of 88 in the OLS regressions since we have no missing data on rainfalls,
while we have only 40 out of possible 55 observations on trade variables per country, as evident from table 1, In
addition, we have only 26 observations on German FDI, which is also responsible for a relatively small overall
sample size.
20F-stat and p-value for columns (1) and (2) respectively are 0.10 (0.79) and 0.23 (0.68).
19value of the coecient is around 0.300, suggesting that an increase in the rainfall index by 12
percent (which corresponds to a one standard deviation in rainfalls from the mean for France
and the U.K.) leads to a 3.5 percent increase in Ottoman exports to those countries. The result
does not depend on whether or not we allow for country-specic time trends. Figure 5 shows the
partial plot for column 3; it is clear that the strong rst stage relation is not driven by outliers.
We do obtain a poor rst stage t for Germany and hence we show results without Germany
in columns (4) and (5). First stage t is still strong but the coecients are much larger. This is
simply due to the fact that the instrument has more explanatory power for France and the U.K.
and hence the rst stage ts better. As argued before, exports to Germany were most likely not
a function of the weather, but instead were determined by political reasons and started much
later in our sample.21 Hence we believe that Ottoman exports to Germany were exogenous to
FDI. They may still be aected by the rainfalls, but the time variation in German data is too
short to tell, which leads to a poor rst stage t.
The top panel of Table 4 shows the 2SLS results. These results show that exports were
indeed a signicant determinant of FDI: when the interaction term of exports and OPDA was
not included, the coecient on exports is about 0.330, somewhat exceeding in magnitude its
OLS counterpart but of a similar magnitude. When the interaction term is included, the 2SLS
estimate reaches 5.000 before 1881, and that eect decreases after 1881 (the Exports  OPDA
coecient is negative but insignicant), supporting our previous ndings. A 3.5 percent increase
in exports from the rst stage regression (which was a result of one standard deviation increase
in rainfall) corresponds to a 5-15 percent increase in FDI given the second stage estimates.
Excluding Germany in columns (4) and (5) still deliver signicant results, but these are not as
strong as before. The coecients are also much larger now, which is consistent with the larger
rst stage coecients when Germany is not included.
Although we have a strong rst stage and second stage, we do worry about weak instruments
given the F-scores. However, given the small sample size, the historical instruments being
signicant at 1 percent, assure us in the validity of our results. To further insure that our
21Quataert (1994). Both FDI and exports were not observed before 1882. FDI started in 1885, a year that
coincides with the Germany-Ottoman strategic partnership. To undermine the hegemony of France and the U.K.,
in 1885, Germans started building a railroad from from Berlin to Baghdad, that is jointly owned with the Ottoman
government.
20results are robust, in addition to 2SLS, we have also performed LIML estimation, which results
in somewhat higher point estimates and generally higher signicance of the exports variable.
The dierence between 2SLS and LIML estimates, however, is never statistically signicant.
5.3 Threats to Identication
Our identication strategy builds on a unique historical context, where as a result of temporary
weather uctuations, the resulting surplus agricultural production was exported. The exclusion
restriction requires that that rainfall shocks will not aect capital ows via any other channel
such as income. Although we can rule this out in the light of the standard theory that posits
only permanent increases in productivity will have an aect on capital inows, we undertake
several tests to further assure that our exclusion restriction is not only relevant but also valid.
In Table 5, using aggregate data and time series variation, we provide evidence that in
response to positive rainfall shocks, exports increase (columns (1) and (2).) Conditional on time
trends, there is a signicant eect of rainfall shocks on exports. We also report an informal test
of the exclusion restriction where we regress GDP on rainfall shocks and exports to show that
rainfall shocks do not have an independent eect on income, since such an eect would violate
the exclusion restriction. It is clear, as shown in column (3) that rainfalls enter this regression
insignicantly upon controlling for exports, providing further evidence that the eect of rainfall
shocks does not operate through their eect on income.
6 Conclusion
In light of the recent global crisis, economists turn to various historical episodes for lessons.22
This paper investigates the causal eect of trade on nancial ows using a historical quasi-natural
experiment from the Ottoman Empire to pin down the identication. The provisionistic policy
of the Empire during this period { only a surplus production was exported after the Ottoman
army was fed { constitutes the basis of our identication strategy. Heavier rainfall than usual
created a surplus agricultural production, which was exported under the provisionistic policy.
We nd that one standard deviation in rainfalls from the mean lead to a 3.5 percent increase in
22See Reinhart and Rogo (2009).
21Ottoman exports, which in turn causes a 10 percent increase in capital inows, on average. This
result holds also after accounting for the negative eect of the Ottoman 1876 default on foreign
investment and trade. Our ndings are supportive of trade theories predicting complementarity
between trade and capital ows as a result of causality running from exports to foreign direct
investment.
22Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Source Country
Units of
Variable Measurement, # of Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
millions
France
GDP GBP 55 1137.10 272.21 706.34 1965.43
FDI GBP 41 1.04 1.54 0.04 9.23
Imports from France GBP 40 2.49 4.84 1.58 3.56
Exports into France GBP 40 3.77 0.59 2.32 4.92
Population People 55 39.47 1.26 37.24 41.46
UK
GDP GBP 55 1401.04 405.29 761.00 2354.00
FDI GBP 55 0.39 0.43 0.03 2.12
Imports from the UK GBP 40 7.62 1.47 3.43 9.93
Exports into the UK GBP 40 4.58 1.00 2.49 6.34
Population People 55 36.63 5.18 28.66 45.64
Germany
GDP GBP 55 1259.98 633.49 431.60 2782.56
FDI GBP 26 0.77 0.76 0.09 3.40
Imports from Germany GBP 40 1.11 1.39 0.02 4.66
Exports into Germany GBP 40 0.43 0.51 0.00 1.46
Population People 55 47.50 8.69 35.63 65.05
Ottoman Empire
GDP GBP 49 153.27 36.70 73.97 208.64
Population People 55 16.54 3.10 10.17 21.89
Constructed Variables
FDI/GDP N/A 122 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.008
Exports/GDP N/A 103 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.005
Imports/GDP N/A 120 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.007
Source GDP per capita N/A 165 30.43 8.479 12.11 51.57
Host GDP per capita N/A 147 8.825 1.424 5.128 10.89
Rainfalls N/A 165 -0.024 0.141 -0.716 0.268
Notes: GBP stays for British Sterling. Imports and Exports are Ottoman Empire Imports and Exports. FDI
denotes average Private Capital Inows from source countries (France, Germany and the UK) into the Ottoman
Empire during 1859{1913. Data comes from Pamuk (1987), Table A3.3. Exports and Imports are average values of
goods exported from and imported into the Ottoman Empire from France, Germany and the U.K. over 1859{1913,
from Pamuk (2003) Table 7.5 and Pamuk (1987) Table 2.3, with values converted from Turkish Golden Lira into
British sterlings using Gold Standard exchange rates from Table A1. Source country GDPs come from Mitchell
(1992) Table J1. The table includes data on GDP for France and the U.K., and the NNP data for Germany. NNP
gures for Germany were converted into GDP following the procedure described in Maddison (1991). Ottoman
GDP data is from Clemens and Williamson (2004) dataset. Population gures for the Ottoman Empire are from
Behar (1996). The data on population of France, Germany and the U.K. come from the Maddison dataset.
23Table 2: Ottoman Exports and FDI Inows: 1859{1913
Dependent Variable: log FDI/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log Exports/GDP 0.394 0.297 0.266 0.324 0.551 0.490 0.546
(0.134) (0.069) (0.034) (0.073) (0.099) (0.123) (0.089)
log Exports/GDP  OPDA -0.229 -0.172 -0.161
(0.096) (0.038) (0.040)
Default -1.344 -2.177 -2.190 -0.988
(0.011) (0.685) (0.690) (0.536)
OPDA 0.939 0.982 1.396
(0.782) (0.790) (0.542)
Default/OPDA -0.874 -1.666 -1.617
(0.503) (1.378) (1.367)
Resettlement -0.101 0.876 0.863 1.017 1.014
(0.200) (0.488) (0.485) (0.346) (0.325)
log Source GDP per capita -2.325 -2.613
(2.850) (2.502)




Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 0.274 0.314 0.315 0.393 0.391 0.409 0.412
Sample size 88 88 88 88 88 87 87
Notes: Exports and FDI are normalized by source countries (France, Germany, the U.K) GDPs. Default is a
time dummy variable equals 1 after the default of the Ottoman Empire in 1876. OPDA is a time dummy variable
equals 1 after establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1880. Resettlement is a time
dummy variable equals 1 after 1903 when the Ottoman external debt was signicantly decreased after negotiations
with creditors. Default/OPDA is a dummy variable that is 1 after 1876. For the specications without country
time trends, the Exports variable for each country was detrended prior to estimation. The standard errors are
robust and clustered by country.
24Table 3: Rainfalls and FDI Inows: Reduced Form Regressions




Rainfalls  OPDA -3.976 -4.773
(1.175) (0.780)
log Source GDP per capita -1.116 -1.205
(0.975) (2.290)




Country dummies Yes Yes
Time Trends No Yes
R-Square 0.248 0.371
Sample size 114 114
Notes: FDI is normalized by source countries (France, Germany, the U.K) GDPs. Default/OPDA is a time
dummy variable equals 1 after 1876 after the default of the Ottoman Empire. The standard errors are robust and
clustered by country.
25Table 4: Ottoman Exports and FDI Inows: 2SLS Regressions
Dependent Variable: log FDI/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No No
Germany Germany
log Exports/GDP 0.343 0.325 0.345 5.368 5.097
(0.022) (0.055) (0.037) (3.177) (3.275)
log Exports/GDP  OPDA -3.971 -4.489 -5.724 -5.619
(1.889) (1.867) (5.211) (5.357)
Default -2.160 -2.168 -0.974
(0.688) (0.693) (0.526)
OPDA 0.924 0.955 1.394 -0.497 -32.245
(0.784) (0.795) (0.543) (1.092) (30.895)
Resettlement -0.079 0.891 0.475 0.716
(0.211) (0.475) (0.647) (0.870)
log Source GDP per capita -1.322 -3.082
(2.526) (4.913)
log Host GDP per capita 2.929 3.605
(1.770) (1.736)
R-Square 0.314 0.315 0.393 0.285 0.321
First Stage Regressions of Exports on Rainfalls and Controls
Rainfalls 0.275 0.297 0.298 1.177 1.174
(0.131) (0.119) (0.118) (0.466) (0.445)
Rainfalls  OPDA -0.921 -0.932
(0.487) (0.465)
F-test 4.42 6.20 6.38 4.85 5.08
p-value 0.039 0.015 0.014 0.011 0.009
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Trends No No Yes No Yes
Sample size 88 88 88 64 64
Notes: Exports and FDI are normalized by source countries (France, Germany, the U.K) GDPs. Default is
a time dummy variable equals 1 after the default of the Ottoman Empire in 1876. OPDA is a time dummy
variable variable equals 1 after establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1880.
Resettlement is a time dummy variable equals 1 after 1903 when the Ottoman external debt was signicantly
decreased after negotiations with creditors. For the specications without country time trends, the Exports
variable for each country was detrended prior to estimation. In specications (1) through (5), U.K. and French
Exports are instrumented with Rainfalls, while German Exports are left uninstrumented. In specications (6) and
(7), Germany is excluded from estimation completely. For the rst stage regressions, other controls were present
besides the Rainfalls variables; they are omitted to preserve space. The F-test and its p-value correspond to the
null that the instruments are jointly insignicant. The standard errors are robust and clustered by country.
26Table 5: Aggregate Ottoman Exports and GDP on Rainfalls
Dependent variable
log Exports log Exports log GDP
(only Rainfalls>0)
(1) (2) (3)




Time Trends Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 0.525 0.503 0.818
Sample size 55 27 49
Notes: \Rainfalls" is percentage deviations of rainfalls from the long-run mean in the TR5 statistical region, West
Anatolia, chosen as a representative region due to its largest relative to other statistical regions agricultural land
area according to Table A2. The standard errors are robust and clustered by country.
27Ottoman Empire Imports and Exports 
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Figure 2: Exports and Imports of the Ottoman Empire during 1859{1913
29Private Capital Flows (FDI) 
 





































Notes: Data is from Pamuk (1987). All variables are measured in thousand sterling.













Notes: The gure shows the location of the statistical regions (SRE). TR1-Istanbul, TR2-West Marmara, TR3-
Aegean, TR4-East Marmara, TR5-West Anatolia, TR6-Mediterranean, TR7-Central Anatolia, TR8-West Black
Sea, TR9-East Black Sea, TRA-North East Anatolia, TRB-Central East Anatolia, TRC-South East Anatolia.
Names of the statistical regions and their tags accord to TSY(2005), page 413 \Classication of statistical regions
(SRE)". Long-term rainfall data is available for TR2 statistical region (Griggs et al. (2007)), TR3 region (Touchan
et al. (2003)), TR5 region (Akkemik and Aras (2007)), TR6 region (Touchan et al. (2007)), and TR8 region
(Akkemik et al. (2007)).
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Notes: The scatterplot and the solid line correspond to the rst stage regression for specication (3) from Table 4
with the partial eect of rainfalls on exports being equal to 0.298 with the standard error of 0.118. The dashed
line corresponds to the same specication that excludes UK,1887 and UK,1893. In that case, the coecient is
0.372 with the standard error 0.150.
Figure 5: The partial eect scatterplot of rainfalls and Ottoman Empire exports
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36Table A1: Gold Standard Exchange Rates
Country France United Germany Ottoman
Kingdom Empire
Currency Franc Pound Mark Gold Lira
Sterling
Adopted 04/07/1803 05/01/1821 12/04/1871 01/05/1844
Abandoned 08/05/1914 08/06/1914 08/04/1914 08/03/1914
Grams of Fine Gold 0.2903 7.3224 0.3584 6.6152
Sterling Exchange Rate 25.2215 1.0000 20.4290 1.1069
Dollar Exchange Rate 5.1827 0.2055 4.1979 0.2275
Notes: These data come from Global Financial Data, and available for download at
http://www.globalnancialdata.com/gh/GHC XRates.xls
37Table A2: Agricultural Land of Turkey by Statistical Region (SRE)
Agricultural Land by SRE, thousand Hectare
Total Cultivated Non Share of
Region Land Field Cultivated Cultivated Land
Area Area in Total Land
Lj \Grain Land" \Orchard Land Sj
" (percent)
Istanbul 83 76 7 92
Marmara
West Marmara 1,736 1,510 226 87
East Marmara 1,564 1,226 338 78
Aegean 3,010 2,187 828 73
Mediterranean 2,623 2,132 490 81
Black Sea
West Black Sea 2,251 1,996 256 87
East Black Sea 736 259 476 35
Anatolia
West Anatolia 4,221 4,050 171 96
Central Anatolia 4,003 3,872 131 97
North East Anatolia 1,461 1,443 18 99
Central East Anatolia 1,451 1,328 123 92
South East Anatolia 3,453 3,992 461 87
Total 26,593 23,066 3,526 87
Notes: The data come from Turkey's Statistical Yearbook, 2005. Table 11.11 at page 177. \Orchard" consists of
area of fruit trees, olive trees, vineyards, vegetable gardens, and area reserved for tea plantation.
38Table A3: Ottoman Decomposition of Exports
Decomposition of Exports, percent
France U.K. Germany
Grain produce 16.9 44.8 41.4
Orchard produce 9.2 21.0 31.4
Other 73.9 34.2 27.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: \Grain" produce include corn, wheat, barley, rye. Also, we included cotton into this category, because
cotton is typically rotated with the grain. \Orchard" produce include grape, g, unspecied fruits and vegetables,
vine, olive oil, acorn, hazelnuts and peanuts. \Other" include animal products such as sheep, goat and lamb
wool, leather, silk and several minor categories. \Shares" data comes from Pamuk (2003), page 62, Table 7.2.
For the UK and France, the percentage shares are the averages over 1860-1862; for Germany, we take averages
over 1880-82. This way, for all three countries, we are using the initial exports shares that correspond to the
beginnings of the respective samples.
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